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BOND QUALITY: THE SETTING
OF THE PROBLEM
The Prewar Record
In 1958 W. Braddock Hickman's Corporate Bond Quality and In-
vestor Experience' was published as the second of three volumes in
the National Bureau's Studies in Corporate Bond Financing. Hickman
examined yields and loss rates on domestic corporate bonds over the
years 1900—43, tested different measures of ex ante bond quality against
default and loss experience, and estimated yields realized on defaulted
bonds for various holding periods. Thus the investor was able to de-
termine what his net gain or loss would have been from investing in
bonds of various characteristics and holding them for various periods.
The material for the Hickman study was all "straight corporate
bonds" ofmillion or more, issued from 1900 through 1943, plus a
10 per cent sample of issues below that size. Straight bonds are those
with fixed income and a single maturity date. Income and serial bonds
and all equipment trust certificates were eliminated from the main
part of the study because of the complex task of determining the actual
yields, as were real estate and finance company bonds.
One of Hickman's most important findings is that, broadly speaking,
a diversified portfolio of second-quality issues, even after consideration
of default and loss experience, returned a higher yield than a first-
quality portfolio.2
Hickman noted that several measures of prospective bond quality
were relatively efficient indicators of risk of default. Thus, of the bonds
issued from 1900 through 1943, the default rate of those rated by
agencies in the worst class at offering was seven times that of the best
class.3 Bonds classified in the worst class according to market rating
1. PrincetonUniversity Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1958.
2Seethe discussion in Chapter VI.
3SeeCorporate Bond Quality, Table 1, pp. 10—il. The agency rating is a composite
of the ratings assigned by the investment agencies: Moody's, Fitch, and Standard and
Poor's. (Before 1941 separate ratings were given by Poor's and by Standard Statistics.)
4Themarket rating is the difference between the yield of a specified bond and the
yield of the highest-quality issues of comparable maturity.Bond Quality: The Setting of the Problem 9
had a default rate three times as large as those rated in the best. The
default rate of those that earned their fixed charges the least number
of times (the lowest times-charges-earned ratio) was seventeen times as
large as the rate of those earning their charges the most times. This
over-all experience masked considerably better predictive ability for
the various quality measures in particular time periods and given
industries. Hickman concedes that the measures are not perfect. He
says, "The principal errors of judgment committed by the rating sys-
tems arose from a failure to appraise accurately the earnings trends of
the different industries and to allow fully for cyclical risks."In spite
of this difficulty, these measures of prospective bond quality appear
relatively efficient.
More important from the standpoint of the present study are Hick-
man's findings relating to trends and cycles in observed measures of
quality. He found in the 1900—43 data both significant long-term
trends and shorter-term cyclical movements bearing a definite relation-
ship to conventional business cycles. When "life-span" default rates 6
areclassified by year of offering, both movements are visible.
Hickman suggests that bonds issued in times of relatively high busi-
ness activity tend to have higher default rates than those offered in
years of relatively low activity. He also found that bonds issued in
the early 1920's and in the period 1935—43 had the lowest life-span
default rates. We have been able to confirm his belief that the record
of defaults after 1944 would not change this finding, although up to
now there has not been a real test. Bonds issued in the first decade of
the century and in 1928—29 and 1933 showed the worst life-span default
rates. Hickman reasoned that the tendency of default rates to be high
for bonds issued in periods of heavy financing connected with major
business cycle movements probably resulted from the fact that "in
periods of overconfidence, marginal issues were floated that would not
have found a ready market when business was depressed."He noted
too that the investment agencies also followed a cyclical course in
rating bonds, particularly over the short cycles commonly identified
with inventory movements. This is of great importance to the present
study since, broadly speaking, the postwar period has so far produced
5Ibid.,p. 13.
6Thepercentage of par amounts of bond offerings going to at any time
in their "life spans."
7lbid., p. 23.10 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
several short or inventory cycles but no recognizable major cycles.
Hickman also notes that, "Viewed in full perspective, the period of
the late twenties and early thirties appears as simply a sharp break in
a falling trend in default and loss rates." 8Hisprospective measures of
quality also show a long-term trend toward improvement, especially
for public utility issues. The proportion of par amounts offered bear-
ing superior agency ratings generally rose during the forty-four years
analyzed. Earnings coverage of bonds also improved. Contrary indi-
cations were generally explained by the miserable performance of
railroad and industrial corporation issues in the thirties. While cau-
tion is warranted in drawing conclusions over a span of years termi-
nated by seemingly unusual depression years when both the small
volume of financing and the reactions from previous catastrophic losses
had been evident, it will be worth observing whether the data for
the period after 1943 also suggest a long-term improvement in bond
quality.
The Postwar Study, Sources and Methods
Data for public offerings were obtained from Moody's Bond Survey,
which lists current offerings. These are essentially complete, although,
for the purpose of comparison with data on the prewar years, income
bonds, equipment trust certificates, real estate and finance company
bonds, and foreign obligations were eliminated by editing for most
tabulations. Serial issues were also eliminated in some tabulations in
conformity with the Hickman practice. Table 1 shows the comparison
between public offerings tabulated here and those listed by the Securi-
ties arid Exchange Commission, with virtually all of the difference
being accounted for by income issues.
The problem of determining the adequacy of coverage for direct
placements is more complex than that for public offerings. For the
greatest part of the period analyzed in the earlier study, direct place-
ments were almost negligible; only from the middle 1930's on did they
become important. Even here the direct placements were relatively un-
complicated, compared to the larger public offerings. In the postwar
period, however, not only the increase in volume of direct offerings but
the proliferation of types of such instruments greatly increased the
problem of analyzing quality. A few illustrations of this point will make
Slbid.,p. 102.Bond Quality: The Setting of the Problem 11
TABLE 1
Offerings Studied as Proportion of Aggregate Domestic Corporate
Bonds, Excluding Financial and Real Estate Issues, 1948-65
(per cent)
Publicly Directly
























Source:Col. 1:Table A-i,. col. 4 ÷col.3; col. 2:Table A-I,
col. 8col. 7.
clearwhy the problem of quality comparisons of direct placements over
time has proved so difficult.
Hickman excluded corporate bonds with serial payment provisions
from most of his tabulations on quality because he was interested in
yield in relation to quality; yield computation is frequently difficult
for bonds which are repaid in instalments. The exclusion of serials
made little difference in the pre-Worid War H years; but following the12 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
war, omitting them would have cut the volume by almost half. Blanket
exclusion of serials was therefore unjustified in the postwar period,
though it meant that strict comparability was not preserved. They are
included here. Finally, the postwar period experienced a proliferation
of financing methods which has played hob with Hickman's rigid
classification of bond characteristics. One can question whether bonds
for real estate developments such as shopping centers should be ex-
cluded, as they were. The security for these bonds essentially consisted
of leases with major national retailing firms which, had they chosen to
build directly, would have financed the construction by debentures that
would have been included under the Hickman definition. Likewise,
should consumer finance company long-term notes be excluded when
the borrower was merely a "captive" finance company of a major U.S.
durable-goods manufacturer?
Table 1 also compares total direct placements analyzed in this study
with the volume recorded by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Differences between totals in this study and the SEC figures are prin-
cipally caused by lack of publicity about many direct offerings. Our
source probably excluded some offerings and included others which
were negotiated but not taken down in the year stated or were taken
down by banks.9 In spite of these problems, from 1948 to 1965, 89.5 per
cent of the SEC compilation of direct placements is analyzed here.
Additional evidence from even more limited studies is also cited at
various relevant points.
Evaluation of the Findings
Apart from problems of comparability, how good is the totality of
evidence cited here on bond quality in the postwar period? First, let
us admit that the quality of a debt instrument cannot be judged inde-
pendently of the conditions to which it is subject during its life. Thus
in Chapter III, where the postwar default record of bonds is discussed,
any absolute judgment that the low incidence of default justifies the
conclusion of better quality in postwar than prewar bond offerings is
obviously questionable. Clearly intertemporal judgments are most dif-
ficult in this area. Ex post measures of bond quality—defaults, losses,
9Asearch was made in Moody's manuals for all direct offerings of $10 million or
more (and some smaller ones) listed in the Investment Dealers' Digest to avoid such
erroneous inclusions, but information was not always available.Bond Quality: The Setting of the Problem 13
changes in contract terms—for the most part do not tell how bonds
differ in quality over time. Somewhat better are cx ante measures such
as earnings coverage, security, and perhaps agency ratings. Here again,
however, it is hard to make a priori comparisons of quality over time
when conditions are not the same. To illustrate, greater stability of
income in the postwar period may mean a given earnings coverage
affords greater protection to bondholders now than it would have
thirty years ago. Likewise, given security provisions may be more useful
in reducing default in the postwar period than they were in the prewar
period. Finally, judgments taking into account many factors, such as
those embodied in the agency rating, may change quality implications
over time even though the definition of Aaa bonds, for example, does
not change. In terms of defaults or losses, may not bonds rated Baa
in the 1960's be equivalent to Aa offerings of the late 1920's, even
though characteristics of coverage, security, and so forth are grossly
different? Clearly, part of the quality judgment concerns not the in-
herent characteristic of the bond but the conditions of the economy—
will future depressions be less severe?
One aspect of the quality problem has not been faced up to at all—
the question of valuation of losses and the possibility of offsets by gains.
For example, an institutional investor may suffer losses on some invest-
ments, which may be offset by unexpected gains on other assets. Hick-
man found the presence of a substantial number of bonds redeemed
prior to maturity at a call premium. The result was a substantial wind-
fall gain which, according to Hickman's calculations, increased the
realized yield of lower-rated issues above that of prime-quality issues.1°
It is possible that the total returns realized on issues bearing con-
vertible rights, warrants, and other noninterest benefits in the postwar
period should be taken into account in determining the quality of bond
offerings. Quite likely many investors have realized benefits from con-
vertibles and warrants attached to bonds out of all proportion to their
losses on bond offerings.
Finally, in this compilation of factors making for problems in judging
quality, one step has been taken as given—the relation between ex ante
10Thisfinding has been challenged by Harold Frame, who suggests that the
premium on bonds called prior to maturity should be offset against the lower yields
available on reinvestment at reduced rates. See Harold G. Frame and Robert H.
Mills, "Effect of Defaults and Credit Deterioration on Yields of Corporate Bonds,"
The Journal of Finance, September 1961, pp. 423—434.14 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
and cx post quality measures. For this, reliance has been placed on the
evidence produced by Hickman, although it is not known whether this
judgment is valid. It may be that intangibles of credit selection, amorti-
zation of principal payments, and contract modification have substan-
tially changed the default and loss likelihood of bonds of given char-
acteristics when judged by earnings coverage, agency rating, security,
and market rating. Here it is particularly important to note that the
three factors listed above—credit selection, amortization of principal,
and contract modification—are closely associated with the greatly en-
larged practice since prewar times of placing bond issues directly with
the ultimate holders.
Practically all direct placements have some prepayment provision,
whether in the form of serial maturities or sinking funds. Because of
the small number of holders, the distinction is almost meaningless and
often cannot be made from the available information. To maintain
comparability with the Hickman study, which includes straight bonds
placed publicly or privately (directly), with or without sinking fund
provisions, but excludes serial bonds, separate tabulations have been
provided which include and exclude direct placements. The exclusion
of direct placements reduces the total par amount by over 40 per cent.
Publicly placed serial bonds were issued in very small amounts after
1943 and have been included in certain tables. While the prepayment
arrangements may have had an effect on the relation between ex ante
and ex post measures of quality, this effect may not have been much
different from that of the many sinking fund bonds issued in the
twenties, thirties, and early forties.
A final word is necessary about terminology and measurement. Most
of the tables have gone back to 1944 and 1945 in order to link up with
Hickman's data, and use of the term "postwar" should be understood
to include these war years. It has been necessary to make a few com-
parisons using a smaller number of years, since the data, for the most
part compiled by government agencies, did not cover the full period.
In the light of incomplete data, a changed composition of bonds,
and economic conditions quite different from the prewar period, how
can the reliability of this study be evaluated? We are fairly well con-
vinced that our conclusions on quality changes in the postwar period
are correct. We are less sure of the comparisons with earlier periods,
but by no measure reject the evidence that quality in general hasBond Quality: The Setting of the Problem 15
improved. Finally, we are quite unsure of the absolute measures of
quality; i.e., that 95.6 per cent of all bonds offered in the postwar
period are of investment quality or that only 0.2 per cent of postwar
bond issues have defaulted. These are our own evaluations; the reader
is cautioned not to treat the findings uncritically.
Characteristics of Postwar Bond Financing
The early postwar years were characterized by growing public confi-
dence—though not completely without doubts—that financial affairs
and institutions' practices were fundamentally "sound." While a recog-
nizable undercurrent of speculation flourished at times, considerable
progress seemed to have been made both in perfecting the tools of
investment analysis and the institutions themselves, as compared with
the 1920's. Until the late 1950's, it is probably fair to say, few doubts
assailed investors. Sharp breaks in the stock market in connection with
President Eisenhower's health; the development of Russian space ve-
hicles; failure or near failure of major commercial real estate develop-
ments; the collapse of the new-issue market in 1962; isolated brokerage,
savings-and-loan, and banking failures; and greater foreclosures in
mortgage markets all add to the feeling that perhaps conditions are
basically less changed than generally realized. Still, the corporate bond
area has been relatively untouched by the failures that earlier plagued
this financing instrument.
Table 2 shows that in the years 1948—65 corporate bond offerings
totaled $122.4 billion, or over 70 per cent more than was offered in the
period 1900—43. This is all the more remarkable because of the ability
of firms to generate their own capital, as will be seen later. A major
change had also occurred by industry. Railroad offerings and even those
of other transportation firms in the postwar period had become only a
minor part of the total instead of one-quarter as in the earlier period.1'
Utility offerings constituted almost the same proportion in these two
periods. Since, as Hickman has shown, railroad bonds were quite dis-
tinctive both in ex ante measures and in ultimate quality experience,
the virtual disappearance of straight bond obligations of railroads helps
11 Equipment trust certificates are omitted throughout this paper as they were in
the prewar study. They are generally o( much shorter maturity and the specific
security more easily liquidated than true railroad bonds. For this reason, their
exclusion is felt to be legitimate.16 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
TABLE 2








Railroads (transportation) 18,595 26.013,933 11.4
Public utilities 33,426 46.753,749 43.9
Industrials 19,523 27.354,68244.7
All offerings 71,544100.0122,364100.0
Public and direct placements
Public offerings 66,425 92.866,04554.0








Source:W. Braddock Hickman, The Volume of Corporate Bond
Financing since 1900, Princeton for NBER, 1953, Table A-b, pp. 284
ff., and Statistical Measures of Corporate BondFinancing since 1900,
Princeton for NBER, 1960, Table 118, p. 211; and SEC, June 1966
release on Corporate Securities Offered for Cash in the United States
and various releases in Statistical Series on Corporate Securities
Offered for Cash Sale.
aConvertible =convertibleinto common stock. The data on con-
vertibles and nonconvertibles include bonds of financial and real
estate issuers, which are excluded from other sections of the table.
to explain some of the observed changes in bond quality between the
two periods.
The most important difference between bond offerings in the 1900—43
period and later was the development of direct offerings. Whereas only
7 per cent of all bond offerings in the earlier period had been placed
directly, a shade under half of the value of corporate bond issues in
the postwar period were directly placed. As Table 3 shows, direct place-Bond Quality: The Setting of the Problem 17
TABLE










Source:1900-39: Hickman, Volume of Corporate Bond Financing,
TableA-lO, pp 284 f. (straight bonds only); 1940-49: ibid., plus this
study's Table G-i; 1950-65: Table A-i (SEC figures for Total Minus
Financial and Real Estate).
ments were insignificant before the enactment of the .Securities Act of
1933, when they immediately became important and have continued
gradually to increase.
Other comparisons between prewar and postwar bond offerings are
more difficult to come by. It is interesting to note, however, that the
general impression that convertible bonds have been much more im-
portant than formerly is not sustained by the evidence, admittedly
covering less than the full span of postwar years. There is little differ-
ence in the proportion of bond issues that are convertible into common
stocks for the two periods, as may be seen in Table 2.
Not only the types of corporate bonds have changed since the period
covered by Hickman; bonds have also changed in their relative impor-
tance in the economy. Large as the absolute value of bond financing
was in the postwar period, it was becoming a relatively less important
means of financing. Table 4 shows for the period 1946—65 that bonds
and notes constituted 10 per cent of nonfinancial corporation financing
in comparison with 20.5 per cent in the 1901—12 period, 14 per cent
from 1923 to 1929, and an actual negative figure (because of net retire-
ments) in the 1930's. The major offsetting change that has occurred to
make up for the diminished sale of corporate bonds has been greater
internal financing (except in the 1934—39 period) and greater use of—
18 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
TABLE 4
Structural Changes in Sources of Financing of
Nonfinancial Corporations, 1901-65
Percentage of TotalSource of Funds
1901-121923-291934-391946-65
Source of Financing (1) (2) (3) (4)
!nternal
Total 55.2 54.7 97.6 69.6
Capital consumption allow. 37.9 39.8 124.8 43.7
Net saving 17.3 14.9 —27.3 25.9
External
Total 44.8 45.3 . 2.4 30.4
Borrowing, total 30.8 25.9 —6.6 26.7
Short-term. 8.0 4.3 1:0 14.2.
Long-term 22.5 21.6 —7.6 12.5
Bonds and notes 20.5 14.2 —5.2 9.6
Mortgages 2.0 7.4 —2.4 3.0
Equity securities 14.0 19.4 9.0 3.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total (billion dollars) 40.0 86.1 28.9 831.8
Source: Cols. 1—3:all except long-term borrowing from Raymond
W. Goldsmith, The Flow of Capital Funds in the Postwar Economy,
New York, NBER, 1965, Table 37; bonds and notes and mortgages,
computed from Goldsmith, Financial Intermediaries in the American
Economy Since 1900, Princeton for NBER, 1958, Table 53. Col. 4:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds,
Table 4D, in May 1966 Bulletin; F/F Levels, May 3, 1966; F/F An-
nual, November 6, 1965, and 1963 Supplement. Short-term borrowing
includes bank loans, n.e.c., trade debt, and an estimated portion of
other loans. The remainder is included in bonds and notes.
Note: Figures do not necessarily add to total because,of rounding.
short debt (bank and trade loans). Of all external financing, however,
bonds now constitute about one-third, surprisingly close to their im-
portance in the 1920's although less so than in the 1901—12 period.
One more comparison will show how significant these findings are.
Table 5 shows what proportion long-term corporate debt representsBond Quality: The Setting of the Problem 19
TABLE 5
Relative Importance of Selected Components of Public and















1916 3.5 10.2 1.5 5.4
1921 24.9 9.4 17.0 4.8
1926 24.7 14.2 11.4 6.3
1931 27.7 17.0 10.2 8.5
1936 23.6 13.5 20.9 9.0
1941 20.6 12.9 26.6 7.7
1946 10.4 8.2 5.8 3.4
1951 12.7 12.9 4.2 4.4
1956 14.1 17.1 31.9 6.0
1961 15.8 20.1 26.2 6.9
1965 16.4 22.5 21.3 7.3
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census
Historical Stati.stjcs of the U.S., Colonial Times to 1957, Washington,
1960, p. 664; and Survey of Current Business, May 1966, p. 12.
of public and private debt at the beginning of each five-year period
since the series originated in 1916. If these figures are correct, corporate
long-term debt is nowhere near as large a factor in the total debt struc-
ture as it was when America entered World War II, although it has
been creeping up slightly in the postwar period. On the other hand,
mortgage debt of individuals is considerably higher than in 1941.
It has been difficult to provide a direct comparison with Hickman's
study to determine how bond quality compares prewar and postwar,
and at the same time to describe accurately the quality characteristics
of contemporary corporate bonds. The question arises, if Hickman's
simplifying steps, such as the elimination of serial bonds, lack of specific
examination of convertibles and warrants, and exclusion of finance and
real estate bonds, are also followed in the postwar period, how repre-
sentative is the area studied of the universe of corporate bonds?20 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
This is known: corporate bonds are a less important means of
financing business than they were in the period prior to the 1930's,
when internal funds were less adequate. Corporate bonds are also a
smaller proportion of public and private debt.
In view of the problems of this study, what can be said about the
accuracy of the general findings? Probably the changes indicated here
are in the correct direction, but judgments as to absolute quality levels
of bond instruments or of institutional holdings of such bonds en masse
are hazardous. At best, the hazard of financial catastrophe arising from
unsoundness of corporate bonds is probably less than it has been in
previous times, not only because most quality indicators, as will be
seen, give indication that bonds are better instruments than during
some years of the prewar period but also because neither the relative
importance of corporate bonds as a financing medium nor their impor-
tance as a part of the investment structure is as great as in the Hickman
period.
The major development in the corporate bond field in the postwar
period has been the growth of direct placements. These offerings, being
essentially private contracts between the borrower and lender, have less
homogeneity than, and in many other respects do not resemble, public
offerings. In any case, there are few data in public sources describing
them. For this reason, a major effort has been made to compile and
describe a number of quality measures of direct placements and to do
what could be done to make these measures comparable to those avail-
able on public issues. If this task were not undertaken, it could be
legitimately charged that our statements on quality referred to only
part of the universe of corporate bonds.